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Abstract 
In 2018 the European Commission (its Directorates-General Joint Research Centre and 
Energy) as part of their activities on long-term operation (LTO) launched a project called 
“Modernisation and Optimisation of the European Nuclear Supply Chain” to investigate 
possible solutions for the supply chain challenges currently facing European utilities and  
licensees of nuclear facilities, in particular nuclear power plants (NPPs) for power 
generation, such as obsolescence of structures, systems and components (SSCs) and the 
difficulty in finding new suppliers for safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities. This report 
is the first project deliverable and has the purpose to assess to what extent utilities in 
European countries with operating nuclear facilities are concerned about supply chain 
challenges and to what extent solutions to address these challenges in the sense of 
increased use of non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment for safety-
related SSCs or use of SSCs designed and manufactured according to alternative nuclear 
codes and standards (other than the ones normally used in the country in scope) are 
already possible. The content of this report is based on information from two meetings 
the European Commission – Joint Research Centre organised with European utilities and 
national nuclear industry associations and from answers to a questionnaire provided by 
those organisations. Representatives of utilities or national nuclear industry associations 
from the following European countries attended the two meetings and kindly provided 
answers to the questionnaire and are thus covered by this report: Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the Ukraine (answers for the United States of America were provided as well for 
comparison).  
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Executive summary 
Context and motivation 
In 2018 the European Commission (EC), Directorates-General Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) and Energy (ENER), as part of their activities on long-term operation (LTO) 
launched a project called “Modernisation and Optimisation of the European Nuclear 
Supply Chain” to investigate possible solutions for the supply chain challenges currently 
facing European utilities and licensees of nuclear facilities (in particular nuclear power 
plants (NPPs) for power generation) such as obsolescence of structures, systems and 
components (SSCs) and the difficulty in finding new suppliers for safety-related SSCs in 
nuclear facilities. The following routes are considered to provide adequate solutions to 
respond to these challenges: 
1. Enable wide and general use of non-nuclear industry standard components and 
equipment (manufactured according to ISO, EN, etc.) in nuclear facilities, in 
particular for SSCs of lower safety class (SC3), without any additional nuclear 
specific requirements, providing (a) the components and equipment have a 
proven record of high quality and functionality, (b) they are subject to additional 
qualification tests to meet environmental and seismic requirements as appropriate 
and (c) they undergo a dedication process that provides reasonable assurance 
that they deliver their intended safety function. 
2. Allow the use of safety-related SSCs produced according to alternative nuclear 
codes and standards, meaning nuclear codes and standards that are different to 
the ones that are normally used in the country that hosts the nuclear facility. 
To assess the supply chain situation in European countries EC-JRC organised two 
meetings with representatives of European utilities and national nuclear industry 
associations plus European and international nuclear organisations and EC-ENER in June 
2018 and March 2019 respectively. Beside presentation of the supply chain situation in 
their countries and associated challenges the representatives of the utilities or national 
nuclear industry associations were asked to answer a questionnaire. The latter contained 
nine questions addressing the following supply chain challenges: (i) level of concern 
about SSC obsolescence, (ii) difficulty to find new suppliers, (iii) & (iv) repair vs. 
replacement of safety-related SSCs, (v) procurement of “new” SSCs according to old 
legacy requirements, (vi) efforts and graded approach for quality assurance (QA) 
documentation for safety-related SSCs, (vii) use of non-nuclear industry standard 
components and equipment for safety-related SSCs, (viii) use of alternative nuclear 
codes and standards and (ix) use of modern state-of-the-art technologies for safety-
related SSCs. Utilities or national nuclear industry associations of the following countries 
kindly answered the questionnaire (in alphabetical order): Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and 
the United States of America (U.S.)3 
Main findings 
The received answers showed that the utilities of the majority of European countries with 
NPPs in operation are significantly concerned about SSC obsolescence or it is becoming a 
growing concern while also having difficulties in finding new suppliers. “Elaborative” 
maintenance and repair of already installed SSCs is the preferred path forward for 
utilities in most European countries. Only if “elaborative” maintenance and repair is not 
possible anymore then replacement with modern similar SSCs is performed, which in 
most cases requires a lengthy and costly dedication and qualification process and final 
approval by the regulator. In some countries procurement of new safety-related SSCs to 
replace currently installed ones is performed according to old legacy requirements 
because the original requirements have not changed or to avoid qualification 
 
3 Answers for the U.S. were kindly provided by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for comparison.  
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uncertainties and risks or because the current regulation does not support a different, 
modern and more efficient way forward. 
In response to the above supply chain challenges the utilities in a number of European 
countries have implemented a commercial-grade dedication (CGD) process with the 
approval of their respective regulators. CGD is originally a process developed in the U.S. 
by EPRI for the U.S. nuclear industry and approved by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (U.S. NRC) to provide reasonable assurance that a component or piece of 
equipment produced according to a non-nuclear industry standard (commercial item) 
performs its intended safety function if used in safety-related SSCs of nuclear facilities. 
CGD allows utilities to procure non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment 
from suppliers that do not run a nuclear quality assurance (QA) programme and thus 
opens the door to new potential suppliers.   
Utilities in Belgium, France and Switzerland performed CGD trials or have already 
performed CGD in the past. Utilities in the Czech Republic, Finland and Sweden are in the 
process of developing and implementing their own CGD processes to enable the use of 
modern high-quality non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment for 
safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities. The Romanian utility Nucleareletrica and utilities 
in Spain have CGD processes already implemented and plan to use them more widely in 
the future in response to growing supply chain challenges. The utility of Slovenia, NEK, 
has a continuous investment programme in place, participates in joint and proactive 
supply chain initiatives (mainly U.S. based) and has had an established CGD process in 
place since 1995. As a consequence, NEK is less affected by supply chain issues than 
utilities in other European countries. 
The use of alternative nuclear codes and standards for the design and manufacturing of 
safety-related SSCs is possible in the Czech Republic, Finland, Romania and the Ukraine 
after substantiation. In Belgium the usage of SSCs designed and manufactured according 
to alternative nuclear codes and standards is common practice and even included in the 
regulatory guidance. In France alternative nuclear codes and standards have been 
applied for a number of SC2 and SC3 SSCs for the European Pressurised Water Reactor 
currently under construction in Flamanville (Flammanville EPRTM). In the remaining 
countries the use of alternative nuclear codes and standards is either not planned at the 
moment (Spain and Sweden), not allowed (Slovenia) or extremely challenging 
(Switzerland). 
The use of modern state-of-the-art technologies for safety-related SSCs is only possible 
in the above countries if these technologies are either covered by nuclear codes and 
standards or they have been nuclear qualified via extensive tests to demonstrate their 
equivalence, robustness and safety function. 
Key conclusions 
The example of the Slovenian utility NEK shows that continuous investments (e.g. 
component replacements), participation in joint efforts with other utilities and an 
established CGD process is key in solving the supply chain challenges currently facing 
European nuclear utilities. If utilities of a European country decide to implement CGD 
then the approval of the respective national regulator is required, as national regulation 
most likely may need to be changed to allow the use of CGD. This means that a decision 
to move along this route has to be taken by all the nuclear stakeholders (utilities and 
regulator) in each country individually. If utilities of European countries decide to 
implement and perform CGD they should aim for wide cross-border collaboration 
including joint issuing of common and coherent documentation (e.g. technical 
specifications for SSCs) and data sharing from dedication processes and qualification 
tests of non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment. Ideally, European 
utilities shall perform CGD according to a common harmonised European approach or 
guidelines. Such an approach or guidelines need to be developed by European utilities in 
close interaction with European regulators based on international and European 
experience and accounting for European specifics. Developing such an approach or 
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guidelines requires review of supply chain management practices, technical requirements 
(design, manufacturing) and quality management (QM) practices for safety-related SSCs 
as well as benchmarking of these against technical requirements and QM practices of 
non-nuclear industries. 
As regards the use of alternative nuclear codes and standards Belgium could be seen as 
a forerunner and possibly a good example to other European countries. However, this 
needs to be further assessed and documented in order for other European countries to 
benefit and build on the Belgian nuclear industry practice.  
The implementation of a CGD process allowing wide use of modern non-nuclear industry 
standard components and equipment for safety-related SSCs and possibly the use of 
safety-related SSCs produced according to alternative nuclear codes and standards 
should also become the common future best practice for new-build reactors and even for 
future advanced reactors (i.e. small modular reactors (SMRs) of any coolant and Gen IV 
reactors) considering the long design life of 60 years for most of these reactors, as the 
existence of original equipment manufacturers of safety-related SSCs for such long time 
periods cannot be guaranteed and obsolescence of certain SSCs can be expected after a 
couple of years of operation (e.g. for I&C equipment). Operating Gen III/III+ and IV 
reactors with an established CGD process in place from the start of the new build project 
would mitigate running into the same supply chain challenges / legacy problems now 
facing the current European fleet. 
It should be remembered that nuclear facilities are designed, constructed, operated and 
maintained for safe and reliable operation in accordance with high-level principles, 
requirements and concepts (e.g. Defence-in-Depth) and their safety may not be 
jeopardised by a single failure, human error or a combination of these. To ensure this, a 
nuclear facility design shall apply the concepts of diversity, redundancy, physical 
separation and functional independence throughout the lifetime of the facility. This 
requires the timely implementation of preventive and predictive maintenance of the 
nuclear facility by the use of modern SSCs of high quality and proven reliability, 
functioning when needed, from different and best available sources, including suppliers 
that offer and prefer producing SSCs according to non-nuclear industry standards or 
alternative nuclear codes and standards.  
Related and future JRC work 
EC-JRC continues to investigate the greater use of high-quality non-nuclear industry 
standard components and equipment in safety-related SSCs of nuclear facilities and 
greater use of SSCs according to alternative nuclear codes and standards to address 
supply chain challenges currently facing European utilities. In this sense EC-JRC intends 
to contribute to the review of supply chain management practices, technical 
requirements (design, manufacturing) and QM practices for safety-related SSCs and 
benchmarking these against technical requirements and QM practices of non-nuclear 
industries, as it does already within ongoing nuclear codes and standards development 
activities (e.g. CEN Workshop 64). EC-JRC intends to organise workshops with European 
regulators, technical safety organisations (TSOs) and utilities to inform and support them 
in this area, and already plans to organise a workshop on CGD primarily for European 
regulators and TSOs towards the end of 2020 together with EC-ENER. EC-JRC intends to 
contribute to planed European or international guidelines on CGD. 
   
 
 
7 
1 Motivation 
1.1 Nuclear Supply Chain Challenges 
Utilities are required to invest continuously in their nuclear facilities, in particular nuclear 
power plants (NPPs), to ensure the highest level of safety. Utilities are all mandated to 
comply with the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) performance objectives 
and criteria (PO&C) [1]. The most relevant PO&C for this report are Equipment 
Performance (ER.1) and Equipment Failure Prevention (ER.2). 
Equipment Performance (ER.1) obliges utilities to strive for high levels of reliability of 
equipment that supports nuclear safety, plant reliability and emergency response 
capability by (i) finding solutions to equipment problems in a thorough, timely manner 
with the support of engineering and other organisations (e.g. suppliers) and by (ii) 
identifying, prioritising and addressing long-standing equipment issues in a timely 
manner [1]. 
Equipment Failure Prevention (ER.2) obliges utilities to carry out preventive and 
predictive maintenance and performance monitoring to prevent failures of equipment 
important to safety, reliability and emergency response [1].  
While complying with the WANO PO&C utilities are facing a number of increasing 
challenges related to the supply chain of safety-related structures, systems and 
components (SSCs). 
The greatest challenge is SSC obsolescence. The original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) of the safety-related SSCs currently installed in nuclear facilities either do not 
exist anymore, have stopped producing the specific SSCs according to the original design 
as it is specified by the original equipment qualification (e.g. a requirement and 
justification for a like-for-like4 replacement of components and equipment of safety-
related SSCs) or have discontinued nuclear quality assurance (QA) programmes required 
by the regulation.5  
Equally challenging for utilities is finding new SSC suppliers. Potential new suppliers 
offer SSCs to utilities with an added risk-premium6 or chose not to sell to them at all, 
because: 
▪ Potential new suppliers are not familiar with current legacy nuclear requirements 
(legacy nuclear industry standards) or do not understand them; 
▪ Potential new suppliers are not interested in supplying to the nuclear industry / 
utilities because the market for such SSCs is too small; and 
▪ Potential new suppliers consider the financial risk of supplying SSCs to the nuclear 
industry as too high. 
Existing suppliers lose interest to re-perform qualifications even for SSCs supplied in 
the past, because the suppliers have adopted new modern best practice standards for 
their ongoing and normal production of SSCs to their non-nuclear industry customers. 
 
4 U.S. NRC definition: “A like-for-like replacement is defined as the replacement of an item with an item that is 
identical. For example, the replacement item would be identical if it was purchased at the same time from 
the same vendor as the item it is replacing, or if the user can verify that there have been no changes in the 
design, materials, or manufacturing process since procurement of the item being replaced. If differences 
from the original item are identified in the replacement item, then the item is not identical, but similar to 
the item being replaced, and an evaluation is necessary to determine if any changes in design, material, or 
the manufacturing process could impact the functional characteristics and ultimately the component's 
ability to perform its required safety function.” Link: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-
comm/gen-letters/1991/gl91005.html  
5 SSC obsolescence is one of the reasons for the recent revision of WANO PO&C. Under reason for changes it 
states as point 12: “Increased emphasis on ageing and obsolescence issues in the equipment reliability 
area.” [1] 
6 According to European licensees the added risk-premium can be in the order of ten times the price of the 
same SSC if supplied in accordance with non-nuclear industry standards. 
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The cost of maintaining the skillset needed for production of SSCs in accordance with the 
legacy nuclear standards is no longer motivated due to the low order volumes and a 
perception of high financial risk driven by uncertainties.   
The consequences of the above challenges are that utilities prefer to postpone heavy 
(and in some countries cumbersome) equipment qualification processes and avoid timely 
replacement of safety-related SSCs affected by obsolescence. Instead of replacing the 
affected SSCs, utilities may instead continue to repair and maintain the SSCs for as long 
as it is possible (“elaborative” maintenance), even though better similar state-of-the-art 
SSCs are in principle available (but not similar enough for a like-for-like replacement 
based on the old equipment qualification). Utilities may spend large efforts for 
procurement of “new” SSCs according to old legacy requirements in order to avoid 
equipment qualification uncertainties and risks. Often repair of currently installed SSCs is 
the preferred way forward in many countries with potentially considerable efforts for cost 
and personnel. 
Beside the above challenges utilities are confronted with formal strict QA 
documentation requirements (methods & procedures predating ISO 9001) for safety-
related SSCs. Utilities in some European countries perceive the efforts for issuing QA 
documentation for SSCs of lower safety class (SC), in particular for SC3, as excessively 
high and attribute this to “spill-over effects”, meaning that more or less the same level of 
QA documentation for a SC3 SSC is required as for a SC1 or SC2 SSC, because it is to be 
used in a nuclear facility. 
Utilities have the general difficulty to receive approval for using modern state-of-
the-art technology for SSCs in nuclear facilities, because the national nuclear 
regulation does not allow it or the established nuclear design code or standard that is 
normally used in a country does not cover the modern state-of-the-art technologies or 
because of conservatism in practice. 
Key to overcome the above supply chain challenges is to clarify (and possibly re-define) 
the link between nuclear safety requirements, as they are laid down in guidelines by 
WENRA, IAEA, etc., and the industry practice to manufacture, select and procure 
components and equipment for safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities. 
The above challenges originate from the time when the current fleet of NPPs were 
designed in the 1960s / 70s. In those days the existing industry standards used for 
design, manufacturing, quality control (QC) and QA of components and equipment were 
not sufficient for safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities. Today’s quality management 
(QM) standards according to the ISO 9000 family, which is the basis for QA of most non-
nuclear industries, did not exist back then. This forced the nuclear industry to create 
their own nuclear specific codes and standards for safety-related SSCs to ensure the 
necessary quality and reliability of SSCs to perform their nuclear safety function. 
Components and equipment produced according to nuclear codes and standards 
(“nuclear-grade items”) differed from similar items produced according to non-nuclear 
industry standards (“commercial-grade items”) in terms of specifics related to the 
documentation of the applied manufacturing techniques and in their assembling, QA and 
QC requirements and corresponding documentation, inspections during production, 
performance testing and any other product life-cycle development steps. 
These self-developed nuclear specific codes and standards became the established 
nuclear codes and standards as we know them today (e.g. ASME7, AFCEN8 codes, KTA9, 
etc.) and often they were (and still are in most cases) just developed at national level to 
satisfy the needs of the national nuclear industry. In addition, specific nuclear codes and 
standards became mandatory in national nuclear regulation in a significant number of 
countries, meaning for safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities in a country only certain 
nuclear codes and standards may be used. Mixing of components and equipment 
 
7 American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
8 French Association for design, construction and in-service inspection rules for nuclear island components 
9 “Kerntechnischer Ausschuss” (Nuclear Safety Standards Commission of Germany) 
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produced according to different nuclear codes and standards in the same nuclear facility 
is normally not best practice. As a result, the available supply chain for safety-related 
SSCs is artificially limited to those supplying components and equipment designed and 
produced according to one nuclear code and standard or the other. In addition to 
technical, material related, environmental related and other requirements nuclear codes 
and standards often define in detail the requirements for the management of QA and QC 
of the supplier. The evolving diversification of nuclear codes and standards across the 
various European countries with nuclear facilities since the 1960s / 70s has contributed 
and essentially led to the above supply chain challenges facing the nuclear industry 
today. 
Non-nuclear industry standards (e.g. ISO, EN, …) have progressed significantly in the last 
30-40 years, including the QM standards of the ISO 9000 family that nowadays are the 
basis for QA of most non-nuclear industries. Since they were first introduced in 1987, 
they have become the most globally spread standards to ensure that products and 
services consistently meet customer’s requirements and that their quality is consistently 
improved. This also applies to the nuclear sector in many countries, as national nuclear 
safety regulatory QA and QM requirements also refer to the standards within the ISO 
9000 family. 
Non-nuclear industry standards like the EN standards, as well as the ISO 9000 standard 
family, are continuously developed and frequently updated in order to improve the 
safety, quality and reliability of components and equipment. According to a recent study 
commissioned by Finnish utility TVO [2] the QA and QM requirements of safety-related 
SSCs in nuclear facilities in Finland are almost comparable with the corresponding 
requirements of the oil and gas industry for the same SSCs. High-quality – high-reliability 
SSCs can be produced by using well established non-nuclear industry standards like the 
American Petroleum Institute (API), International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) / International Society of Automation 
(ISA).   
1.2 EC Project Modernisation & Optimisation of European Nuclear 
Supply Chain 
As the above supply chain challenges are pressing issues for almost all utilities of NPPs in 
EU Member States and neighbouring countries, the European Commission (EC), 
Directorates-General Joint Research Centre (JRC) and Energy (ENER) launched a project 
called “Modernisation and Optimisation of the European Nuclear Supply Chain” in 2018 to 
investigate possible solutions for the above supply chain challenges along the following 
routes: 
1. Enable wide and general use of non-nuclear industry standard components and 
equipment (manufactured according to ISO, EN, etc.) in nuclear facilities, in 
particular for SSCs of lower safety class (SC3), without any additional nuclear 
specific requirements, providing (a) the components and equipment have a 
proven record of high quality and functionality, (b) they are subject to additional 
qualification tests to meet environmental and seismic requirements as appropriate 
and (c) they undergo a dedication process that provides reasonable assurance 
that they deliver their intended safety function. 
2. Allow the use of safety-related SSCs produced according to alternative nuclear 
codes and standards, meaning nuclear codes and standards that are different to 
the ones that are normally used in the country that hosts the nuclear facility. 
Adoption of the first route would increase the pool of potential suppliers to those 
companies that are normally only active in non-nuclear industries. It would also give 
utilities and the nuclear industry in general the opportunity to benefit significantly from 
the massive progress in non-nuclear industry standards in the last 30-40 years (as briefly 
described in Section 1.1) by putting utilities in a position to procure modern high-quality 
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– high-reliability components and equipment produced according to these standards for 
safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities. 
Adoption of the second route would increase utilities’ pool of suppliers to those 
companies that normally produce SSCs according to nuclear codes and standards 
different to the ones according to which the utilities’ nuclear facilities were originally 
designed and constructed. As stated earlier mixing of components and equipment 
produced according to different nuclear codes and standards in the same nuclear facility 
is normally not best practice and should be performed with great care [3] [4]. In 2012 
ASME Technologies LLC published a comprehensive study comparing well-established 
nuclear codes and standards for mechanical SC1 components [4]. The nuclear codes and 
standards that have been compared are French RCC-M, U.S. ASME (Section III), 
Canadian CSA (N-285), Japanese JSME (S NC1) and Korean KEA (KEPIC-MN). The study 
revealed differences in detail between the various nuclear codes and standards. The 
existence of these differences in detail does not mean that one nuclear code or standard 
is better than the others in the sense that its application results in better quality of 
mechanical components or an ability to provide an improved safety function. Differences 
in detail between the various nuclear codes and standards arise from the dependencies 
between the different requirements of the nuclear code or standard and the differences in 
detail are compensated by other requirements of the nuclear code or standard. The 
different nuclear codes and standards must be applied in their entirety to result in 
mechanical components with the intended quality. These conclusion have also been 
drawn by the nuclear regulators that participate in the Codes and Standards Working 
Group (CSWG) of the Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) [3]. 
However, there could be cases where the use of SSCs according to alternative nuclear 
codes and standards is beneficial or even becomes necessary. The shutdown of KTA-
based NPPs following the decision to phase-out nuclear power generation in Germany 
makes it economically unattractive for suppliers of such NPPs to upkeep their KTA 
certification and to still support utilities of the remaining KTA-based NPPs. This may force 
the utilities of the remaining KTA-based NPPs, e.g. in Switzerland, Spain and the 
Netherlands, to turn to suppliers offering SSCs according to alternative nuclear codes and 
standards (e.g. ASME) instead. 
The use of an alternative nuclear code or standard may provide benefits, in the sense 
that it may cover a modern state-of-the-art technology that the nuclear codes and 
standards normally followed by a utility do not cover. For example, since its 2016 edition 
RCC-E10, the design and construction rules for electrical and instrumentation and control 
(I&C) systems and equipment of French type reactors, contains requirements and 
systematic approaches to qualify programmable digital electronic devices in I&C systems 
of nuclear facilities. These requirements and suggested approaches could be also of 
interest to utilities that normally do not follow AFCEN codes including RCC-E. 
Besides increasing the pool of potential suppliers, the above two goals may also provide 
benefits for plant safety, because 
▪ Installation of high-risk and high-cost first-of-a-kind (FoaK) designs would be 
largely avoided (FoaK SSCs is often the result of suppliers using tools (i.e. codes 
and standards) they are not familiar with); 
▪ Suppliers would be allowed to use the standards and manufacturing methods they 
are most familiar with guaranteeing high SSC quality and functionality (this also 
enables a robust application of the suppliers SSC reliability data); 
▪ The probability of common cause failures would be reduced due to the 
deployment of commonly used SSCs with a proven record of high quality and high 
 
10 RCC-E are the design and construction rules for electrical and I&C systems and equipment of French type 
reactors. RCC-E is issued and maintained by AFCEN. 
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functionality from other industries and to use different designs for redundant 
systems more easily; 
▪ Preventive and predictive maintenance and performance monitoring-based 
replacement / maintenance of SSCs would become easier, also allowing repair and 
re-use of replaced SSCs at another facility more easily; and 
▪ Number of unplanned shutdowns are expected to be reduced as SSCs can be 
more easily replaced in a timely and predictable manner (which enables and 
enhances preventive and predictive maintenance). 
The scope of the project is nuclear facilities such as the current reactor fleet, new-build 
reactors, radioactive waste management facilities and future advanced reactors (e.g. 
small modular reactors (SMRs), Gen IV). 
1.3 Aim of this report 
The use of non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment for safety-related 
SSCs or the use of safety-related SSCs produced according to alternative nuclear codes 
and standards in nuclear facilities is to some extent already common practice in a 
number of European countries or has been at least applied to some safety-related SSCs 
in a number of nuclear facilities in Europe on a trial basis within utility run pilot projects. 
Utilities in a few European countries, most notably Slovenia, have a methodology in place 
for accepting components and equipment for safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities that 
were designed and manufactured under a “commercial (non-nuclear industry)” QA 
programme. This methodology is commonly referred to as “commercial-grade dedication 
(CGD)”.  
CGD was developed in the late 1980’s in response to increasing difficulties by utilities in 
the United States of America (U.S.), Slovenia and Spain to find nuclear qualified 
suppliers. Suppliers to the nuclear industry in these countries had (and still have) to have 
a stringent nuclear QA and QM system in place meeting the 18 requirements of U.S. 
regulation 10CFR50 Appendix B [5] and described in more detail the ASME NQA-1 
standard [6]. CGD, as it has been implemented in the U.S. and a number of European 
countries is an acceptance method by which QA and QC becomes the responsibility of the 
utility rather than the supplier. In this way the utility can procure items or services from 
commercial (non-nuclear industry) suppliers that do not run and maintain a nuclear-
specific QM system. This opened the door to more suppliers and procurement options for 
utilities in those countries compared to the restrictions on suppliers that conform to 
nuclear-specific QM systems. EPRI report no. 3002002982 [7] describes in detail the CGD 
process as it is applied in the U.S., Spain and Slovenia.  
The purpose of this report is to assess the supply chain situation in European countries 
with operating NPPs and the extent to which the use of components and equipment 
manufactured according to non-nuclear industry standards (after going through a 
dedication process, either U.S.-based CGD or similar process) or alternative nuclear 
codes and standards for safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities of those countries is 
already possible and under which conditions. 
1.4 Methodology 
To assess the supply chain situation in European countries EC-JRC organised two 
meetings with representatives of European utilities and/or national nuclear industry 
associations plus FORATOM, WANO, the World Nuclear Association (WNA) and EC-ENER 
in June 2018 and March 2019 respectively. Beside presentations of the supply chain 
situation in their countries and associated challenges the representatives of the utilities 
or national nuclear industry associations were asked to answer a questionnaire. The 
latter contained the following nine questions: 
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Question 1  
To what extent is your company / are the utilities / licensees in your country concerned 
by SSC obsolescence issues? I.e. the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) of the 
safety-related SSCs currently installed in your nuclear facilities do not exist anymore or 
have stopped producing the specific SSCs according to the original design specifications 
(mandated by the original equipment qualification, e.g. a requirement and justification 
for a like-for-like replacement of the SSC in scope) and you envision that you will need to 
replace these SSCs within the foreseeable future? 
Question 2 
How difficult is it for your company / the utilities / licensees in your country to find 
suppliers for SSCs for your nuclear facilities? If it is difficult, what are the reasons? E.g. 
potential new suppliers of safety-related SSCs are not familiar with the current legacy 
nuclear requirements or do not understand them; potential new suppliers are not 
interested in supplying the nuclear industry / utilities because the market for such SSCs 
is too small; current legacy nuclear requirements are too difficult to comply with and the 
market is so small that the required effort does not justify the cost; potential suppliers 
consider the economic risk of supplying SSCs to the nuclear industry as too high; other 
difficulties? 
Question 3 
To what extent does your company / the utilities / licensees in your country avoid 
replacement of safety-related SSCs due to obsolescence issues, although better similar 
state-of-the-art SSCs are in principle available (but not similar enough for a like-for-like 
replacement based on the old qualification), but it is based on an unfamiliar nuclear or 
industrial standard resulting in a perceived uncertainty & risk in the qualification of the 
better state-of-the-art SSC that replacement is avoided and mending the currently 
installed SSCs is the preferred way forward? 
Question 4 
To what extent does your company / the utilities / licensees in your country spend large 
efforts mending (by elaborative maintenance measures) old SSCs instead of replacing 
them with new state-of-the-art ones? In this case it is envisioned that there are SSCs 
available in accordance with a known standard (nuclear or non-nuclear industrial) but 
replacement is still perceived as a risky way forward. This question is linked to the 
specific definition of what constitutes a like-for-like replacement of SSCs in your country. 
Question 5 
To what extent does your company / the utilities / licensees in your country spend large 
efforts in procuring “new” SSCs according to old legacy requirements in order to avoid 
qualification uncertainties and risks? (E.g. reverse engineering of SSCs according to old 
legacy requirements.) This question is also linked to the specific definition of what 
constitutes a like-for-like replacement of SSCs in your country. 
Question 6 
How does your company / the utilities / licensees in your country perceive the level of 
efforts required (high, moderate (as always) or small) for obtaining the desired quality 
assurance (QA) documentation for replacement / maintenance of safety-related SSCs for 
the current nuclear fleet and / or new build facilities? This in particular for SSCs of lower 
Safety Class (SC3)? If the level of efforts required are high what are the reasons (e.g. 
could it be regulation related “spill-over effects”: Regulation in your country demands 
more or less the same level of QA documentation for a SC3 SSC as for SC1 / SC2 SSC, 
because it is to be used in a nuclear facility; is there uncertainty about the level of QA 
documentation needed resulting in a tendency of doing too much, e.g. more than is 
actually needed; conservatives in practice; industrial protectionism; a prevailing attitude 
of nuclear exceptionalism; other difficulties)? 
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Question 7 
To what extent are non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment used or 
planned to be applied for safety-related SSCs in current nuclear facilities and / or new 
build nuclear facilities in your country? In particular, for SSCs of lower safety class (SC3 
and lower)? If such components or equipment are difficult to use for safety-related SSCs, 
what are the obstacles against their use? 
Question 8 
To what extent are SSCs according to an alternative nuclear code or standard used or 
planned to be used in nuclear facilities in your country, current or new build? (Example: 
alternative nuclear code or standard could be nuclear design codes different to the one 
normally used in your country.) If not easily possible, what are the obstacles? (E.g. could 
it be unfamiliarity with the alternative nuclear code or standard by your national 
regulator, the independent reviewer (third party) or your own engineering staff? 
(Examples of alternative nuclear codes and standards: Russian PNAE G7, Korean KEPIC, 
Canadian CSA, Japanese JSME, French AFCEN and American ASME.) 
Question 9 
To what extent can you use modern state-of-the-art technology for safety-related SSCs 
in nuclear facilities in your country? If this is generally difficult what are the reasons (e.g. 
the national regulation does not allow it; the established nuclear design code or standard 
(normally used) does not cover the modern state-of-the-art technology (for example: 3D 
printing, powder metallurgy and high tech fibre composite components); conservatives in 
practise; other difficulties)? 
Utilities or national nuclear industry associations of the following countries kindly sent 
answers to the questionnaire (in alphabetical order) and attended the above two 
meetings: Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the U.S.11 Their answers are summarized in the 
following chapters.  
 
 
 
11 Answers for the U.S. were kindly provided by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for comparison.  
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2 Nuclear Supply Chain Situation in European Countries 
2.1 Belgium 
In Belgium SSC obsolescence starts to become an issue and consequently Electrabel and 
Tractebel (ENGIE) have established a dedicated team working on the topic, thereby 
exploring all possible options, from identifying new suppliers for affected SSCs to using 
new designs or new ways of manufacturing such SSCs. 
The main difficulty is not to find suppliers that are able to produce nuclear-grade SSCs 
and are qualified accordingly, but to obtain high-quality SSCs from suppliers in general, 
irrespective whether they are nuclear-grade or not. Tractebel-ENGIE sees a decreasing 
will among suppliers to provide SSCs of acceptable quality. The main reasons for this 
trend are seen to be: 
▪ Economic pressure resulting from delays caused by very ambitious delivery dates 
or toughly negotiated prices for SSCs; 
▪ Lack of recognition (financially or in terms of provided training or support) of the 
importance of workers manufacturing the SSCs (e.g. welders, forgers, …), whose 
impact on SSC quality is more significant than the QA system in place. 
Replacement of obsolete SSCs with similar state-of-the-art SSCs (but not similar enough 
for a like-for-like replacement based on the old qualification) is mostly avoided in 
Belgium. Confidence in the reliability of SSCs (essential for safety-related SSCs) depends 
to a large extent on operating experience feedback. As the experience feedback for new 
technical solutions or SSCs that have never been used in a nuclear facility before is 
normally not available, their implementation in nuclear facilities is inevitably difficult. To 
compensate for the missing operating experience feedback a lot of qualification work is 
needed for new technical solutions of such SSCs. Because of the significant efforts for the 
qualification and fear not to succeed, ENGIE prefers not to go along this route. 
In general, in Belgium ENGIE applies a policy of both maintaining / repairing already 
installed SSCs that have been in use for long time and replacing such SSCs with new 
state-of-the-art ones. The choice on which path to follow is based on an economic 
assessment considering timing, support by nuclear vendors, and safety impact. If the 
utility decides to replace a SSC with a new state-of-the-art one, normally an update of 
the original specifications and codes are made taking into account the evolution of the 
industry and the safety context. 
ENGIE sees the effort by suppliers to issue QA documentation for SSCs as high, but this 
is needed for their safe and efficient operation. The utility has faced some difficult 
interventions on equipment, including justification of continued operation of some SSCs, 
because the original design and manufacturing files did not contain all the information to 
the required level. The reason for insufficient information is generally the reluctance of 
the supplier to provide all the required documentation of the SSC in scope, because of 
either the extra effort involved or reasons related to intellectual property. 
ENGIE has experience in procuring and using components and equipment manufactured 
according to non-nuclear industry standards, i.e. commercial-grade items or various 
construction codes. This practice is not prohibited in Belgium and a corresponding 
methodology to accept commercial-grade items in nuclear facilities in Belgium has been 
developed. While for components and equipment manufactured according to accepted 
nuclear design codes and corresponding QA schemes performing its safety function is 
presumed to be guaranteed in all specified conditions, this needs to be demonstrated for 
commercial-grade items. This requires extra work, so that from an economic point of 
view there is no difference compared to using components and equipment manufactured 
according to accepted nuclear design codes or QA standards. Going the normal way of 
using components and equipment manufactured according to accepted nuclear design 
codes is easier than justifying an alternative. However, such an alternative may be 
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needed when supply of the SSC in scope according to the normal way is not possible 
within due time or when poor quality is expected from the usual nuclear supplier. 
Procurement and installation of SSCs designed and manufactured according to other 
nuclear design codes than ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC, the reference 
nuclear design code in Belgium) is normal practice in Belgium. A code reconciliation is 
performed in those cases. This option was discussed with the nuclear regulator and was 
included in “regulatory” guidance documents12. 
If a specific equipment or piece of technology is covered by nuclear design codes it allows 
easy verification by the utility and the regulator that it is able to provide its safety 
function. Experience feedback is an important asset to demonstrate reliability of the 
equipment or piece of technology in scope. 
Use of new technologies in nuclear facilities, especially if not yet codified, requires the 
utility to perform extensive studies to provide proof that the technology may be used for 
safety-related SSCs. Performing such studies jointly by several utilities, in particular for 
SSCs that are highly affected by obsolescence, helps achieving results at a reasonable 
cost. The results of these studies can then be used to build safety files complying with 
the local regulation. 
2.2 Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic utility CEZ faces obsolescence problems for certain SSCs, because 
the OEMs terminated their production. SSCs that were only produced for nuclear facilities 
and which cannot be used in other non-nuclear plants pose the greatest challenge. In 
some cases the OEMs of these SSCs even no longer have the original design 
documentation that would allow in principle to re-produce the original SSCs. Also rapidly 
evolving technology for certain SSCs is another challenge, especially for instrumentation 
and control (I&C) systems. For this reason I&C systems have been replaced in Czech 
NPPs or will be replaced in the near future. 
Finding new suppliers for SSCs in nuclear facilities in the Czech Republic is difficult. The 
market is too small and the costs for manufacturing SSCs meeting all the requirements 
associated with their usage in nuclear facilities is perceived as too high. As a result CEZ 
procures SSCs increasingly from foreign suppliers that are active in larger markets. 
In general, maintenance and repair of already installed SSCs is the preferred path over 
replacement of SSCs due to obsolescence issues. SSCs are only replaced if maintenance 
has become impossible because of unavailability of spare parts or if it is more expensive 
than replacement with other similar SSCs. To use a similar safety-related SSC the 
national regulation mandates an approval process, even if the similar SSC is in 
accordance with a known standard. In the approval process the limitations given by the 
original design need to be respected (ensuring a like-for-like replacement). 
Before the usage of any new type of SSC in nuclear facilities conformity with the project 
requirements of the nuclear facility and impacts of installing such a SSC is always 
assessed. As this requires quite some efforts like-for-like replacements of SSCs is 
preferred. 
In the Czech Republic a graded approach for documentation of safety-related SSCs in 
nuclear facilities is applied, meaning that the scope of documentation for a SC3 SSC is 
lower than for a SC1 or SC2 SSC. 
For SSCs of lower safety classes components and equipment designed and manufactured 
according to non-nuclear industry standards, standard commercial means (meeting the 
requirements of industrial standards) are used. To do so the component or equipment 
needs to meet defined quality requirements and testing needs to be performed to 
 
12 These documents are internal documents and thus not publicly available. A detailed description of the Belgian 
approach to the ASME BPVC, including potential alternatives, can be found in “Global Applications of ASME 
B&PV Code – Part 1”, Chapter 5 “Belgium Pressure Equipment Regulation”, published by ASME in 2016 [8]. 
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demonstrate its safety function. The challenge of using such components and equipment 
is their timewise limited availability in the market. Thus for a possible replacement of the 
SSC in scope a few years later it is highly likely that the then available non-nuclear 
industry standard item needs to undergo testing to demonstrate its safety function again, 
if it does not allow for a like-to-like replacement. 
The main factor for the decision whether a component or piece of equipment may be 
used for a safety-related SSC in a nuclear facility are its characteristics, that its quality 
has been proven and that it meets other requirements. Whether it complies with 
alternative nuclear codes and standards is only a supporting factor in the decision 
process. 
Modern state-of-the-art technologies may only be used for safety-related SSCs in nuclear 
facilities after performance of extensive tests and analyses proving that their use will not 
reduce safety. 
Due to the unavailability or limited availability of some SSCs in accordance with the 
current nuclear industry standards, CEZ is currently in intensive discussions with the 
regulator about the possibility and conditions of using commercial-grade items for SSCs 
of lower safety classes. A detailed proposal for a procedure to demonstrate the 
commercial items QA (CGD) has been developed. Pilot projects for selected SSCs (relay, 
thyristor, check-valve, opto-isolator) were implemented in accordance with the proposed 
procedure as a basis for the discussion with the regulator. 
2.3 Finland 
In Finland utilities are facing obsolescence issues. The number of suppliers of nuclear 
SSCs is lower than in the past and some OEMs do not exist anymore. Obsolescence is 
identified e.g. for analogue electronic items, control and protection systems (such as 
reactor protection systems), protection relays, frequency converters, ... 
The number of suppliers for nuclear-grade SSCs seems to decrease further and the 
future outlook is not promising. For some nuclear-grade SSCs the number of potential 
suppliers is already very limited and the causes for this situation are the limited market 
and nuclear-specific requirements. 
For many SSCs the available nuclear-grade components and equipment on the market 
are not the best ones or the ones of highest quality and sometimes not even the most 
reliable, but the ones that come with the most solid documentation. In particular among 
SSCs that nowadays contain programme code are cases where Finnish utilities made 
special arrangements instead of normal replacements. 
To a large extent the lifetime of installed safety-related SSCs is extended by elaborative 
maintenance. Also old but still functional SSCs from decommissioned plants are used. 
The most challenging SSC to replace / modernise (and thus the one that poses most 
risks) is the automation system for which all possible alternatives are investigated. 
Replacement and modernisation is predominantly performed for non-safety SSCs. 
Procuring new SSCs according to old legacy requirements is performed where applicable. 
However, for certain SSCs the requirements have changed since they were first approved 
thus not allowing this approach. For some SSCs arrangements were made to procure old 
SSCs and use them to replace the old and installed SSCs. One example is the 
replacement of the reactor automation system. 
The level of efforts required for obtaining the needed QA documentation for replacement 
SSCs is seen as high, cumulating to several man-years annually in each involved 
company (utility and supplier). Even if there is certainty among the required level of 
documentation, the efforts for producing it is perceived as high, in particular for SC2 and 
SC3 SSCs. This has a direct impact on costs and supplier’s willingness to provide offers 
and to supply SSCs.  
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Components and equipment designed, manufactured and documented according to non-
nuclear industry standards are used for non-safety classified SSCs only. In principle they 
can be used for safety classified SSCs as well, especially for SC3 SSCs. Nevertheless, this 
path is normally not pursued, because it requires significant efforts and there is no 
commonly applied methodology for the dedication and qualification of such components 
and equipment. However, the Finnish utilities are in discussion with the regulator (STUK) 
in this matter and have launched a national project to change this (the KELPO project, 
see below). 
In Finland the use of alternative nuclear codes and standards for safety-related SSCs is in 
principle possible, but requires dedicated approval of the regulator. This requires 
significant efforts by the utility to prove compliance of the proposed alternative codes 
and standards. Mutual recognition of regulator’s acceptance of a SSC in one country by 
the regulator of another country would provide significant benefits.   
The use of modern state-of-the-art technology for safety classified SSCs in nuclear 
facilities is extremely difficult. Modern state-of-the-art technologies normally do not have 
long operational histories, which hardly justifies the efforts for demonstrating their safety 
function to the regulator. 
KELPO Project 
The current supply chain challenges prompted the Finnish utilities Fortum, TVO and 
Fennovoima with support of the regulator STUK13 to launch a national project to ensure 
preconditions for the safe operation of the NPPs in the long term. As part of the project 
utilities develop procedures to qualify and license high-quality components and 
equipment produced according to non-nuclear industry standards for their usage in 
safety-related SSCs, especially of the lower safety classes. The objectives of this project, 
the KELPO project [9], are the following: 
▪ Putting a graded approach into practice. 
▪ Establish preconditions for the use of high-quality non-nuclear industry standard 
components and equipment for SC3 SSCs. In the first phase the focus is on 
mechanical components. 
▪ Ensure a comprehensive vendor / supplier network. 
▪ Suggest alternative methods for the development of qualification processes.  
The KELPO project aims at ensuring and further developing nuclear safety and securing 
operating conditions of the nuclear industry in changing energy markets. 
Phase 1 of the KELPO project was executed in 2018. The first action was to propose and 
possibly re-define roles of the involved organisations for supervising the manufacturing 
and QC & QA process of safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities. While the regulator 
STUK will focus on plant level, system level and SC1 and SC2 SSCs the utilities will have 
an increased role for lower SC SSCs (especially SC3), as illustrated in Table 1. 
The second action of Phase 1 was to propose ways to increase cooperation between the 
Finnish utilities with the aim of reducing overlapping work, utilising common approvals 
(“national approvals”) and to define common and coherent documentation for safety-
related SSCs and corresponding processes. The third action of Phase 1 was to propose a 
methodology to dedicate and qualify high-quality components and equipment according 
to well established non-nuclear industry standards for their use in safety-related SSCs of 
nuclear facilities. The targeted SSCs are SC2 and SC3 SSCs. With the methodology clear 
and predictable technical requirements for the components and equipment in scope for 
suppliers were issued, similar to other industries. The proposed methodology including 
 
13 STUK adopted a new strategy: “Safety is not achieved through inspections but is a result of responsible 
operators safety solutions and human efforts.” 
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the technical requirements are to be tested in Phase 2 and continued in Phase 3 of the 
KELPO project, which by the time of writing of this report are ongoing.   
Table 1. Proposed new roles for regulatory approvals of plant-, system- and device level design 
and manufacturing oversight. 
 SC1 SC2 SC3 
Plant level STUK STUK STUK 
System level STUK STUK / Utility STUK / Utility 
Device level STUK AIO14 / Utility Utility or third party 
 
The selected components and equipment for the pilot projects in Phase 2 and Phase 3 of 
the KELPO project are a valve (a mechanical component), a battery (an electrical device) 
and a product family of pressure transmitters (automation devices). The experience 
gained from Phases 2 and 3 will support and should finally result in a common 
methodology and corresponding documentation used by all Finnish utilities to dedicate 
and qualify high-quality components and equipment manufactured according to well 
established non-nuclear industry standards for their use in safety-related SSCs of nuclear 
facilities. This will enhance the licensing process of safety-related SSCs and, if needed, 
lead to proposals for changing the national regulatory framework.    
Furthermore, the results and conclusions of the KELPO project should also contribute to 
more harmonised licensing practices (in the form of a licensing roadmap 2025) for 
safety-related SSCs in European nuclear facilities, for existing ones and for future 
advanced ones like SMRs. Throughout the KELPO project Finnish utilities closely interact 
with the EC supply chain project and similar national projects of other European countries 
like the one in Sweden (see below). 
2.4 France 
French utility EDF S.A. is running a large fleet of 56 units with an average age of more 
than 30 years. Consequently, EDF S.A. is very concerned about SSC obsolescence. Some 
suppliers have disappeared from the market while others have stopped producing the 
original SSCs. Nevertheless, the maintenance policy of the French fleet requires periodic 
replacement of some components and equipment. Modifications are defined and planned 
by the EDF S.A. engineering team to replace obsolete items with newer ones, subject to 
adaptation to the environment and the process in which the item in scope operates. 
However, in the majority of cases, EDF S.A. has put in place contracts with original 
suppliers for maintaining equipment in operational conditions, repairing equipment or 
supplying new components. These contracts include provisions to preserve industrial 
capabilities, skills and tools, and to monitor evolutions in the manufacturing process that 
could affect the qualification performance of the equipment.  
End-of-life stocks for certain items have also been created, in particular for electronic 
devices, which then benefit from specific storage conditions. Equipment replacement due 
to obsolescence is performed in a limited way for equipment qualified to accidental 
conditions (MQCA), with the support of the EDF S.A. engineering team. 
 
14 Authorised inspection organisation (AIO). It is an organization that conducts tasks related to the conformity 
assessment and approval of the design and manufacturing of components and structures in nuclear 
facilities on behalf of the regulator, in this case STUK. 
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According to the EDF S.A. supplier panel there is a good level of response of potential 
suppliers for most of the SSCs of new-build projects involving the European Pressurised 
Water Reactor (EPR) allowing them to benefit from current EPR new-build projects in 
Finland, France, China and the UK. The nuclear codes and standards used for an EPR (the 
AFCEN codes) are the same ones as those required by the French nuclear regulation for 
the existing plants operated by EDF S.A. Although the number of suppliers for EDF S.A.’s 
fleet of reactors is showing a downward trend there is still a sufficient number of 
suppliers that are willing to follow AFCEN code requirements and thus ensure a good 
level of competition for all relevant SSCs. Moreover, as mentioned above, contracts with 
original suppliers allow maintaining sufficiently large business volumes for EDF S.A.’s 
main suppliers.  
However, despite the large size of EDF S.A.’s reactor fleet and the number of EPR new-
build projects, some companies decided not to supply the nuclear sector because of the 
necessary investments (qualification, documentation, QA) and the small volumes of 
components and equipment compared to other industries. 
SSC obsolescence is subject to detailed studies within EDF S.A. Various solutions are 
investigated, including repair of installed SSCs, replacement with identical SSCs and 
replacement with similar SSCs requiring adaptation to the technical environment in which 
the SSCs in scope will operate and/or even additional equipment qualifications including 
corresponding reporting and documentation. EDF S.A. has the necessary engineering 
capacity and skills to accomplish these tasks, in particular if new equipment qualifications 
are required, taking benefit from EDF S.A.’s fleet size with a high level of commonly used 
SSCs.  
Repeated manufacturing of small analogue electrical devices by specialised companies 
avoids obsolescence of these devices. Spare parts are normally provided according to the 
latest edition of the applicable codes & standards, so EDF S.A. does not need to procure 
SSCs according to old legacy requirements. If replacement of a SSC is needed EDF S.A. 
preferably aims for an identical replacement as much as possible. 
The introduction of the nuclear pressure equipment decree (ESPN Decree) in France 
resulted in a significant increase in the amount of SSC documentation and thereby 
increasing the cost of safety-related SSCs. The requirements for SSC documentation 
according to the ESPN Decree are more stringent for SC1 SSCs compared to SC2 or SC3 
SSCs indicating a graded approach. 
For the qualification of components and equipment EDF S.A. takes benefit from reference 
files, which group together all the documents related to the manufacturing and/or repair 
of the SSC in scope, and keeps track of all modifications of the SSC in scope since it was 
manufactured and qualified. Generally, the level of documentation is substantial, even for 
non-safety SSCs, in view of needs for traceability, maintenance in the long-term and QA. 
The use of non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment for safety-related 
SSCs is challenging, because such SSCs must meet the requirements of nuclear codes 
and standards for their design and manufacturing. Sizing methods, materials, 
manufacturing processes, QC and QA methods need to conform to the applicable nuclear 
codes and standards. Any non-compliances must be justified. Non-nuclear industry 
standards are normally far less prescriptive than nuclear codes and standards. Therefore, 
the application of a non-nuclear industry standard does not generally guarantee the 
compliance with nuclear codes and standards. In case components and equipment 
according to a non-nuclear industry standard (e.g. EN standard) are to be used for a 
safety-related SSC, EDF S.A. issues an additional specification to ensure the quality level 
required by the nuclear design code. Non-nuclear industry standard components and 
equipment are seldomly used for safety-related SSCs in NPPs operated by EDF S.A. If 
such components or equipment are used for safety-related SSCs comprehensive 
justification is needed and this could be provided according to EPRI guide no. 
3002002982 [7]. 
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EDF S.A. authorised the use of nuclear codes and standards other than AFCEN codes for 
safety-related SSCs in new build projects involving the EPR. For the EPR currently under 
construction in Flamanville, France, EDF S.A. accepts KTA and ASME BPVC for SC2 and 
SC3 mechanical SSCs, but the target quality level for these SSCs is the one according to 
RCC-M15. As a consequence, EDF SA has issued additional specifications to complement 
the requirements of the ASME BPVC code to obtain the quality level according to RCC-M. 
EDF S.A. currently runs a project (the RTI project) on managing the engineering 
technical reference standards across EDF new build projects. It should lead to clarification 
and optimisation of requirements for new build projects, trying to distinguish as much as 
possible the requirements coming from non-nuclear industry standards and those specific 
to nuclear-classified items.  
The use of modern state-of-the-art technology for safety classified SSCs in nuclear 
facilities is not prohibited in France and to some extent accounted for in the AFCEN 
codes. For example, the requirements for programmable digital electronic devices is 
included in RCC-E16 since the 2016 edition, which provides a framework for the use of 
such devices in EDF S.A.’s current fleet of reactors and EPR units under construction. This 
is very useful for instrumentation systems, but does not avoid the qualification of such 
devices. Qualification of programmable digital devices is a long process, in particular the 
qualification of their software.  
2.5 Hungary 
The OEMs of Paks NPP Units 1-4 or their post-Soviet successors disappeared from the 
market in the early 1990s and it was a significant challenge for its operator MVM-Paks to 
identify suitable suppliers for its SSCs, either successor companies of the OEMs or 
adequate new suppliers that were able to understand and deliver according to nuclear 
industry requirements. Fortunately, the OEMs built up quite considerable stock of spare 
parts before disappearing from the market and this made the supply of SSCs more 
plannable for MVM-Paks. In general suppliers of safety-related SSCs (meaning SC1, SC2 
and SC3 SSCs) need to be adequately qualified in Hungary and require official 
authorization by the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA, the Hungarian nuclear 
regulator) to supply such SSCs. 
The modernisation and replacement of obsolete components and equipment is an 
ongoing process. For the licensing process to extend the lifetime of Paks NPP Units 1-4 it 
was necessary to demonstrate and justify that the main SSCs operate safely until the 
end of the extended lifetime (and even beyond). MVM-Paks makes significant efforts to 
search and procure unutilised spare parts that were supplied by the OEMs to other 
companies. 
Many potential suppliers are familiar with nuclear specific requirements, own the 
corresponding certificates (as mandated by the nuclear safety codes, etc.) and have 
references. But not all of them want to or can invest to establish an adequate QA and 
manufacturing system that meet the requirements and conditions of a nuclear industrial 
environment. 
For most maintenance tasks MVM-Paks has an established network of suppliers and the 
relevant manufacturers or contractors have the required qualification. If a component or 
equipment is no longer available, the supplier offers an alternative solution for replacing 
the obsolete item. The replacement item needs to be re-licenced by the utility. 
Another challenge is the public procurement process, which is felt as being very lengthy 
and complicated by potential new suppliers, who, as explained above, in addition need to 
undergo a qualification process to be eligible of supplying safety-related SSCs. 
 
15 RCC-M are the design and construction rules for mechanical components of nuclear islands of French type 
PWRs. RCC-M is issued and maintained by AFCEN. 
16 RCC-E are the design and construction rules for electrical and I&C systems and equipment of French type 
reactors. RCC-E is issued and maintained by AFCEN. 
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The policy of MVM-Paks is to use SSCs as long as they provide their function with a high 
level of reliability and without failures. This is based on MVM-Paks’s experience that the 
overall effort for implementing new SSCs with state-of-the-art technology (in particular 
for qualification and licensing) is normally higher than for maintaining the installed SSCs. 
Thus replacement of installed SSCs with new ones is only considered if the replacement 
SSCs provide additional benefits in terms of lower operational and maintenance costs, 
higher electricity production and positive effect on plant safety. The primary concern here 
is the impact of the replacement SSCs on its system integration (e.g. extent of planned 
modifications, suitability for existing I&C systems). Thus if MVM-Paks decides to go along 
this route there must be positive and sufficient operational experience with the 
replacement SSCs from other utilities (good references). In cases where this experience 
is missing, thorough testing of the replacement SSCs and issuing of detailed technical 
justification is needed. Once a SSC has been successfully replaced with a new one the 
same solution is applied to all other units. 
All SSCs must be procured, manufactured or installed in accordance with the 
requirements stipulated in the nuclear safety codes in force and the design base 
determined for each SSC. The qualification requirements for SSCs installed in Paks NPP 
were modified in the past (became more developed). However, each safety-related SSC 
to be installed in Paks NPP within a like-for-like replacement needs to be qualified 
beforehand. In conclusion, the procurement challenges and efforts for both cases, i.e. 
replacement of a SSC with a like-for-like SSC or with a SSC of exactly the same design 
than the currently installed one, are almost the same. However, like-for-like SSCs may 
provide higher reliance. 
Components and equipment manufactured according to non-nuclear industry standards 
may be used for safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities providing they meet the relevant 
requirements and the supplier is qualified. 
State-of-the-art technologies may be used in nuclear facilities providing they are 
qualified and licensed and the supplier is licensed. However, certain technologies (e.g. 
pipelines made of high-density polyethylene or other plastics) are not allowed for safety-
related SSCs.  
For the new-build project Paks II the situation is slightly different and to some extent 
easier. The nuclear safety codes require that the selected suppliers hand over all the 
necessary design documentation for all SSCs to the utility. The design documentation 
provides an adequate basis to produce safety-related SSCs and using state-of-the-art 
components and equipment is a contractual obligation. 
2.6 Romania 
Nuclearelectrica, the operator of Cernavoda NPP in Romania, faces increasing challenges 
related to the supply of SCCs of its two CANDU 6 units at Cernavoda. Both units use 
SSCs dating back to the 1980s and the majority of their OEMs have left the nuclear 
market or have merged with other companies. As a result the knowledge associated with 
that technology has been lost or decreased by the companies that evolved from the 
OEMs due to strategic reasons. Due to the smaller knowledge base on the currently 
installed SSCs among the OEMs or their successor companies and advances in technology 
Nuclearelectrica expects to widely use new state-of-the-art technology SSCs to replace 
currently installed SSCs within the next ten years as part of plant refurbishment 
activities. 
Finding new suppliers for its nuclear facilities is a challenge for Nuclearelectrica, because 
of the following reasons: (i) OEMs and traditional suppliers are no longer interested to 
supply the nuclear industry because of the associated risks, which do not outweigh the 
benefits; (ii) new potential suppliers are not interested to comply with nuclear 
requirements, perceive them as very expensive and not providing a sufficient long term 
perspective; (iii) some of the suppliers are big and powerful and try to impose their 
business conditions onto Nuclearelectrica in contracts; (iv) potential suppliers are not 
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familiar with the nuclear standards normally used in Romania; (v) countries / utilities 
with a small fleet of reactors is economically not attractive for potential suppliers.     
Nuclearelectrica has a preventive maintenance programme for most SSCs in place and 
expands it regularly for SSCs with an increased risk of becoming defective. 
Nuclearelectrica spends significant efforts for maintenance and repair of installed SSCs, 
also because the alternative (replacement with a similar state-of-the-art SSC) is not 
always viable. The approach for an obsolete SSC, repair versus replacement with a 
similar state-of-the-art SSC, is chosen on a case-by-case basis, and depends upon a 
number of factors: (i) Potential supplier of a replacement SSC is not familiar with the 
requirements of the nuclear industry and perceives them as too demanding compared to 
the non-nuclear industry standards he is normally working with; (ii) SSC in scope is huge 
and expensive, which favours maintaining and repairing it rather than replacing it. If 
Nucleareletrica chooses to repair a SSC instead of replacing it the reason is to avoid 
qualification uncertainties associated with the replacement SSC. 
If replacement of an obsolete SSC becomes necessary, because maintenance and repair 
of the installed SSC is no longer possible, and a similar state-of-the-art SSC based on a 
non-nuclear industry standard is available, Nuclearelectrica performs a CGD process for 
the similar SSC with prior approval of the regulator. The CGD process gives reasonable 
assurance that the SSC will perform in such a way that the safety function is not 
affected. CGD is mandatory by law for components and equipment that are used for 
safety-related SSCs. Nucleareletrica uses reverse engineering for those SSCs where the 
design documentation is missing and the OEMs do not exist anymore. This solution is the 
most costly and thus is used very cautiously. 
Nucleareletrica perceives the efforts for obtaining the necessary QA documentation for 
replacement / maintenance of SSCs in general as high. Traditional long-term suppliers 
usually provide all the required quality records, where as the QA documentation provided 
by new suppliers is not always sufficient. Romanian regulation requires different types of 
documentation following a graded approach. The adequacy of required quality records 
and QA documentation is analysed on a case-by-case basis.   
Depending upon the situation Nuclearelectrica may accept SSCs manufactured according 
to alternative nuclear codes and standards if equivalence with the Romanian legal 
requirements is proven and finally accepted by the regulator. Nuclearelectrica performs a 
GAP analysis between the legal requirements and the alternative nuclear code or 
standard. In call for tenders for the procurement of safety-related SSCs requirements of 
the nuclear standard normally used in Romania and mandated by law or an alternative 
nuclear code or standard (known by the supplier) and the gaps are included. 
There is a high willingness of Nuclearelectrica to use modern state-of-the-art 
technologies more widely and their implementation is not seen as that difficult. As stated 
above the use of modern state-of-the-art technologies for safety-related SSCs requires a 
qualification process or CGD if qualification is not possible. While doing so it is strongly 
recommended to use proven technologies whose reliability has been previously 
demonstrated. The regulator encourages the use of modern state-of-the-art technology 
for safety-relevant SSCs, but does not encourage the use of novel technologies resulting 
in Foak designs. 
2.7 Slovenia 
NPP KRŠKO (NEK) has a continuous investment program (most of the major components 
have been replaced) thereby reducing the vulnerability to obsolescence. In parallel, a 
proactive approach exists through participating in joint industry efforts (e.g. Nuclear 
Utility Obsolescence Group (NUOG), International Nuclear Utility Obsolescence Group 
(INUOG), EPRI) and having membership in programs facilitating operators support for 
each other and access to existing solutions (Curtis-Wright / Scientech Rapidsmart). NEK 
also contracted Rolls-Royce’s Proactive Obsolescence Management System (POMS) group 
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and Obsolescence manager service. All these efforts are encompassed and addressed in 
a plant programme and procedure. 
Being an U.S. supplier turnkey project through Slovenian legislation, NEK complies with 
U.S. / U.S. NRC regulation and faces the same problems as U.S. utilities and the ones in 
Europe that follow the same regulation, codes and standards: disappearing suppliers, 
suppliers dropping nuclear production programmes, equipment / spare parts are not part 
of the current production programme and suppliers dropping production lines 
(obsolescence). At the same time NEK benefits from the joint efforts and already existing 
solutions. 
Most of the safety-related SSCs of Krsko NPP were originally manufactured in the U.S. 
according to U.S. federal code 10CFR50 and U.S. codes and standards (ASME, IEEE, 
ANSI, ASTM,…) and also installed in other NPPs constructed at the same time (late 
1970’s / early 1980’s in the U.S., Spain, Republic of Korea and Brazil). NEK faces two 
scenarios: 
1. In case the OEM or his successor lost or dropped the 10CFR50 App B QA 
programme, there are companies providing third party qualification and NEK has 
developed a CGD process that can be applied in such cases. 
2. In case the OEM has stopped manufacturing the SSC in scope or went out of 
business, there are companies that provide reverse-engineering services or have 
already existing solutions. 
For both of the above scenarios, a surplus market can be addressed, meaning companies 
have bought surplus stock from operating NPPs, NPPs under construction and never 
completed or NPPs that were shut down or are in the process of being shut down. In 
cases where no direct or alternative replacement of the SSC in scope (equivalency 
evaluation) is available, a modification process is launched. 
In case of good performance and spare parts availability, the obsolete SSC is kept and 
maintained. NEK complies with the laws, codes and standards as defined in the operating 
license, so no unfamiliar nuclear or non-nuclear industry standard is used. In cases 
where no “like-for-like” solution is available, the obsolescence issue is resolved through a 
modification process. 
NEK has a yearly investment programme addressing improvements, replacements, 
licensing requirements, power and safety upgrades. A conservative philosophy is 
maintained and proven solutions are applied. Foak designs are avoided unless not 
otherwise possible. Like-for-like is addressed through the equivalency evaluation process. 
In case of SSC replacements (maintenance), the original SSC design / technical 
specifications are used in conjunction with newer versions of codes and standards as 
allowed by code reconciliation and the licensing process. In case of SSC modifications, up 
to date codes and standards are applied. 
The documentation requirements for SSCs are defined in the purchase order / contract 
and the documentation are either in the form of technical specifications (major 
components, new components) or technical and quality requirements (TQR, like-for-like 
replacements, spare parts). The requirements depend upon the safety classification, 
safety function and type of the SSC. 
In general, documentation is delivered together with the procured item. In case 
witnessing of shop activities is required (e.g. factory acceptance test) NEK uses the 
opportunity to review and collect documentation.  
Particular non-safety related SCCs that are important for plant operation or have specific 
requirements (e.g. fire protection) are classified as augmented quality (AQ). High-quality 
non-industry standards or specific standards (ISO 9000, Underwriters Laboratories) are 
applied and pertinent documentation is required.  
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The above is also systematically addressed during Nuclear Procurement Issues Council 
(NUPIC – U.S. utilities joint audits and approved suppliers list) audits, taking specific 
purchase orders as audit scope. 
Non-nuclear industry components and equipment, intended for nuclear safety-related 
applications, are identified as such at the initiation of the procurement process. The 
nuclear grade qualification is obtained either by contracting a third party qualifier with a 
nuclear QA programme or through the process of CGD as defined in NEK programmes 
and procedures developed in accordance with the EPRI guidelines [7]. 
Alternative nuclear codes and standards to the U.S. codes and standards (ASME, IEEE, 
ANSI, etc.) are not used at Krsko NPP. Slovenian legislation and NEK operating license 
(e.g. USAR) require compliance with U.S. nuclear regulation. 
Concerning the use of modern state-of-the-art technologies the policy of Krsko NPP is to 
look for proven solutions backed by corresponding references. In case the modern state-
of-the-art technology is already nuclear qualified, it can be used. In general, they are 
used for non-safety related SSCs. A couple of years ago an obsolescence issue was 
resolved through reverse engineering and 3D printing. It was published and recognised 
as a best practice in the nuclear industry. 
2.8 Spain 
In Spain NPPs and utilities are facing increasing difficulties in replacing original SSCs and 
finding spare parts. Concerning the latter there is currently an on-going project on CGD 
in order to use non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment in safety 
related SSCs of NPPs. This concerns mainly electrical I&C equipment like relays and 
switches. According to the current nuclear regulation in Spain the use of non-nuclear 
industry standard components and equipment in nuclear facilities is only allowed when 
equivalent nuclear-grade components and equipment are not available in the market 
anymore. In general, CGD is allowed in Spain and supported by national regulatory 
guidance.   
The number of suppliers of nuclear-grade SSCs has decreased over the years. Some 
OEMs do not exist anymore and many potential suppliers are not interested to supply to 
the nuclear industry / utilities due to the high efforts and investments required to adapt 
their products to nuclear requirements and due to the small potential market. The 
difficulty in finding new suppliers leads to the award of projects to a limited number of 
suppliers, typically the OEMs when still available, which results in high prices and not 
always receiving the highest competence. 
Replacement of installed SSCs because of obsolescence is normally avoided providing the 
SSC in scope is still in a good condition. Replacement SSCs have to be manufactured 
according to the nuclear standards specified for the plant. As mentioned above the use of 
non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment in nuclear facilities is only 
allowed when equivalent nuclear-grade components and equipment are not available in 
the market anymore. If a non-nuclear industry standard component or equipment is 
installed within a safety-related SSC it has to undergo a CGD process beforehand. The 
purpose of this process is to demonstrate that the non-nuclear industry standard 
component or equipment has the same level of quality and reliability (and thus the same 
safety) than an equivalent nuclear-grade item. QA comprises all those planned and 
systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a SSC will perform 
satisfactorily in service, analysing the critical characteristics. 
Procurement of SSCs is done in accordance with the original legacy requirements. 
Current regulation does not encourage utilities or nuclear industry to proceed in another 
way. The efforts for obtaining the desired QA documentation for replacement / 
maintenance SSCs is perceived as high and the level of detail as requested by the 
regulator is high. However, the amount of documentation required for a SC1 SSC is 
larger than for a SC3 SCC indicating a graded approach.  
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The use of alternative nuclear codes and standards for safety-related SSCs is not sought 
for NPPs in Spain. Use of modern state-of-the-art technologies for safety-related SSCs in 
NPPs is generally difficult and utilities would face the same challenges as for using non-
nuclear industry standard components or equipment for safety-related SSCs. 
2.9 Sweden 
2.9.1 Vattenfall 
Vattenfall has encountered quality problems and cost escalations in recent procurements 
of SSCs for its two pressurised water reactors (PWRs) at Ringhals and its three boiling 
water reactors (BWRs) at Forsmark. Also there is less interest from suppliers to bid in call 
for tenders for procurement of SSCs. For some obsolete SSCs the OEMs have low interest 
to support Vattenfall in the procurement process. I&C systems is an area of significant 
difficulty. The current strategy is to maintain as far as possible current I&C systems 
rather than to change them. This has resulted in re-manufacturing (and re-engineering) 
of original SSCs in some cases, which required rebuilding of separate assembly lines 
among suppliers. 
European suppliers to the nuclear industry have disappeared or have changed the way 
they are manufacturing components and equipment, meaning that they have organised 
themselves according to today’s common (non-nuclear) industry practice to specify and 
assemble SSCs and having multiple sub-suppliers themselves providing the detailed 
components. Thus suppliers that used to manufacture SSCs mostly alone now find 
themselves in between the nuclear industry and the world wide supply chain. New 
suppliers are not familiar with the legacy nuclear standards. The risk to deliver to the 
nuclear industry is unknown for potential new suppliers, which reduces their interest to 
bid in tenders from the nuclear industry. Long term relations with new suppliers are 
difficult to establish, because order volumes are low and difficult to predict. 
For the re-manufacturing (re-engineering) of certain original SSCs state-of-the-art 
production methods or parts of them can sometimes not be used, because the 
replacement SSCs would then be considered as a design change which would in turn lead 
to a re-evaluation of the entire system in accordance with updated requirements 
(mandated by the Swedish regulation). The requirement in Sweden is that if the 
replacement of a SSC cannot be defined as a like-for-like replacement then the whole 
system needs to be re-evaluated against new updated modern requirements. Compliance 
to new regulations concerning earthquake, internal events, etc. are in many cases 
difficult to fulfil due to current design and layout of SSCs. This results in re-
manufacturing (re-engineering) of original SSCs (e.g. relays, etc.) according to old 
(basically 1970s technology) requirements. 
Maintenance of already installed SSCs in NPPs is the preferred choice and replacements 
are avoided where possible. For SSCs that need to be replaced, because elaborative 
maintenance measures do not allow their continued operation, new simplified “like-for-
like” (1:1) replacement processes are introduced. These processes are to a large extent 
maintenance processes that contain replacements of components with new ones that 
come close to the original components. Simplified processes and safety reviews are 
performed. 
Spending large efforts in procuring new SSCs according to old legacy requirements in 
order to avoid qualification uncertainties and risks is performed to some extent. The 
reactor protection system is a typical example. The original platforms are kept, because 
of the above reasons. 
Vattenfall perceives the level of efforts required for obtaining the desired QA 
documentation for replacement SSCs for its NPPs as high compared to the benefits. 
Rather than accepting a certain set of QA certifications, specific QA-routines are 
performed for every supplier. This involves significant efforts for traveling and issuing of 
QA documents with only little or even no contribution to SSC end quality. 
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In general, the use of components and equipment produced according to non-nuclear 
industry standards for mechanical, pressure retaining SSCs of SC 1-3 in nuclear facilities 
is extremely challenging, as the use of such components and equipment requires 
extensive control documentation that is normally not provided by suppliers of 
commercial-grade items. However, Swedish utilities / licenses currently perform a joint 
project with the aim of implementing a CGD process enabling wider use of non-nuclear 
industry standard components and equipment for safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities 
(see Section 2.9.3). The CGD process will be according to EPRI report no. 3002002982 
[7] and will involve a number of SSCs of different SC. Once the CGD process is 
implemented it will also be used by SKB to procure SSCs for its new back-end facilities. 
SSCs manufactured according to alternative nuclear codes and standards have not been 
used in NPPs in Sweden yet and this option has not been fully assessed by Vattenfall yet, 
but the potential of this option is seen as high going forward. 
Modern state-of-the-art technologies are not used in NPPs in Sweden. The problem is not 
the technology itself, but the requirements. If the form-fit-function is changed too much, 
the SSC in scope is subject to new updated requirements. The regulation requires that 
new updated requirements are imposed for all replacements not complying with the like-
for-like (1:1) criteria.   
2.9.2 Uniper 
Uniper faces significant obsolescence challenges, especially for I&C systems. With 
regards to mechanical and process SSCs the competence and ability of the established 
suppliers is dwindling. For electrical SSCs and I&C systems there is growing reluctance 
among suppliers to support the nuclear industry. Also shifts in technology of such SSCs 
results in complicated rebuilding of plants. 
There are in principal three methods to overcome SSC obsolescence: Repairing of 
installed SSCs, procurement of surplus equipment on the market and manufacturing of 
new SSCs according to old specifications. 
The efforts for mending old SSCs is increasing, both in-house repair as well as 
collaborative campaigns. The efforts for procuring new SSCs according to old legacy 
requirements are still low at the moment, but there is an increasing trend. 
The introduction of new suppliers into the supply chain is increasing the utility’s effort to 
specify and control SSC quality and quality of SSC documentation. These efforts are 
more obvious than efforts of the utility to cope with changed requirements imposed by 
the regulator. 
In Sweden there is a joint effort of all utilities and licensees aiming to increase the use of 
SSCs designed and manufactured according to non-nuclear industry standards. Swedish 
utilities and licensees are in discussion with the regulator in this matter (see next 
section). Usage of SSCs according to alternative nuclear codes and standards is of lower 
priority at the moment. 
2.9.3 National Project “The Use of High-Quality Industrial-Grade Items” 
(“ Industristandard”) 
In 2018 Swedish utilities and licensees published a position paper [10] stating that it 
should be possible to use non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment or 
alternative nuclear codes and standards for safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities, for 
existing ones and new-build, after a suitable assessment (qualification + dedication) by 
the licensee. The appendix of the position paper provides additional guidance and 
justification for the position. 
The publication of the position paper was followed by the launch of a pilot project by 
Swedish utilities and licensees with approval of the regulator SSM to use non-nuclear 
industry standard components and equipment (e.g. from oil & gas, marine, …) for safety-
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related SSCs in nuclear facilities and to implement a CGD process according to EPRI 
report no. 3002002982 [7]. In scope of the pilot project are a number of SSCs of 
different SC as shown in Table 2. 
Crucial for the choice of SSCs in the pilot project was that they are components or pieces 
of equipment and not systems, which was a condition to receive support for the project 
by the regulator SSM. In the Swedish project there is a strict focus on components and 
pieces of equipment (and not systems). The aim is to have the CGD process for the SSC 
in Table 2 completed later in 2020. The Swedish utilities and licensees are willing to 
share data and experience on the CGD process with their counterparts in other countries. 
Table 2. SSCs in scope of Swedish national project to implement an EPRI-type CGD process 
(yellow fields: primary areas for application of CGD). 
 SC1 SC2 SC3 NNS 
Sophisticated 
component (safety 
valve) 
    
Subassembly 
(actuator) 
    
Simple component 
(O-ring) 
    
2.10 Switzerland 
Swiss utilities are facing SSC obsolescence issues for quite a while as part of their 
preventive maintenance strategy. Several OEMs have disappeared from the market in 
recent years, in particular as a result of the decision in Germany to phase out nuclear 
power generation. Procurement of spare parts is more challenging nowadays and 
replacement of existing SSCs requires additional resources than in the past. Some of the 
NPPs in Switzerland or certain SSCs in the plants are based on German KTA standards 
and hence may become challenging to replace. 
The market situation for individual SSCs depends basically on the type of the component 
(mechanical, I&C, etc.). There are several reasons for potential suppliers not to supply to 
utilities and the nuclear sector (regulatory, political, economic etc.). Generally, the 
problem is related to the safety class and the construction, oversight and documentation 
requirements. The local market is small and fragmented, so additional efforts are needed 
to reach out to and attract potential suppliers. 
Swiss NPPs follow a preventive maintenance strategy, which is based on rules set by the 
Swiss regulator and recommendations provided by the SSCs OEMs. The general approach 
is to identify obsolescence issues early enough before they can cause significant 
problems (e.g. availability, long lead time, etc.). However, with regards to ageing of the 
current fleet in the LTO perspective the situation is challenging, as obsolescence issues 
need to be addressed early enough as part of a long-term strategy, which is difficult due 
to the uncertain evolution of the nuclear industry. This trend may make SSC 
obsolescence more critical, as their timely replacement (if needed) may not be possible. 
Following the Fukushima accident utilities strengthened the robustness of their plants 
against extreme accident scenarios. With this task now having been completed plant 
modernisation and SSC obsolescence is the main focus. Repairing installed SSCs or 
replacing them with more modern state-of-the-art technologies is decided on a case-by-
case basis depending on the SSC type and on the specific situation. Furthermore, 
regulatory guidelines define which engineering design standards may be used for SSCs in 
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NPPs. If alternative solutions are introduced, a potentially lengthy justification and 
qualification process needs to be performed. 
Generally, the procurement efforts of utilities for new SSCs depends on their type and on 
the specific situation. As long as original equipment can be purchased at a reasonable 
price, this is the preferred procurement route. Re-producing obsolete SSCs via reverse 
engineering can be a solution, especially for components that require a full assessment of 
economic and safety aspects. But normally reverse engineering is a timewise lengthy 
process and because of these factors reverse engineering of obsolete SSCs is rather 
unusual in Switzerland. 
There are regulatory guidelines and utility specifications in Switzerland which define the 
rules and standards for QA documentation of SSCs in the nuclear industry (ASME, KTA, 
customer specific, etc.). Producing adequate QA documentation for SSCs depends on 
their type, safety class and the experience of the supplier. Introducing new equipment 
and devices for a SSC may lead to a potentially higher safety classification of the SSC in 
scope depending on its original SC and its function. 
For SC3 SSCs use of non-nuclear industry standards is allowed if the original design of 
the SSC in scope is based on them. However, in 2019 the Swiss regulator has issued new 
guidelines and it will contain a new definition of the term “design” (in German 
“Auslegung”) that will become part of the formal regulatory glossary. This new definition 
may impact the choice of SSCs in the future. 
In Switzerland equipment in nuclear facilities is classified according to its importance for 
nuclear safety. A distinction is made between mechanical and electrical equipment as 
well as civil structures. The special requirements for SSC design, production, assembly 
and overall documentation are determined by the given safety classification. Third party 
testing and inspection during manufacturing and oversight by independent experts in the 
form of hold points accounts for a considerable proportion of the SSC costs. 
For mechanical SC 1 and 2 SSCs only two nuclear design codes are allowed, German KTA 
standards and ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section III, Division 1. For 
mechanical SC3 SSCs the use of an alternative nuclear code and standard is allowed, if 
the original design basis of the SSC in scope was already based on the alternative 
nuclear code and standard. The use of a nuclear code and standard other than KTA or 
ASME BPVC would most probably only be possible after compliance with nuclear design 
rules is demonstrated, gaps are justified and as long as this approach is not prohibited by 
nuclear ordinance.  
2.11 Ukraine 
Like all other operators of NPPs, Energoatom, the operator of all NPPs in the Ukraine, 
faces ageing of SSCs. Examples for active SSCs that were in scope of recent efforts for 
NPP lifetime extension are emergency diesel generators, polar cranes, valves, pumps, 
etc. Rehabilitation, modernisation and replacement of SSCs is subject to the 
requirements established in regulatory guide NP 306.2.106-2005 “Requirements to 
Nuclear Installation Modifications and Procedure for their Safety Assessment”. It is based 
on IAEA safety guide NS-G-2.3 [11] and contains all the requirements for SSC 
modernisation, including SSC design development and testing.  
The decision whether an obsolete SSC is replaced with an equivalent (like-for-like) or 
modified one as part of a modernisation or rehabilitation of the SSC in scope is taken on 
a case-by-case basis depending upon a number of factors, such as obsolescence, 
possibility and need to use modern state-of-the-art technology, efficiency etc. 
Currently Energoatom does not experience any difficulties to find suppliers for SSCs 
installed in its NPPs. Instead it faces the opposite problem. Given that SE “NNEGC 
“Energoatom” is a state-owned company, all its procurements need to be carried out 
according to the procedures established in the Ukrainian law “On the Public 
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Procurements”. This can lead to situations where bidders offer components and 
equipment that are not qualified for usage for safety-related SSCs in a NPP. 
Energoatom does not experience significant technical issues with replacing SSCs with 
better similar state-of-the-art ones as such. The greatest challenges are the required 
efforts to achieve endorsement of the technical documentation by the regulator SNRIU 
and to prove the applicability of the normally advanced standard associated with the 
better similar state-of-the-art SSC. 
Energoatom performs failure flow trend analysis for installed SSCs in NPPs and 
recommendations on maintenance practices are continuously made to improve the 
reliability of SSC functioning. Installed SSCs are used and maintained as long as 
economically feasible and safety is ensured. If a component or equipment needs to be 
replaced, because these conditions are not met anymore, Energoatom aims for 
replacement with an equivalent item. The definition of an equivalent item is given in 
regulatory guide NP 306.2.106-2005. An equivalent component or equipment is a 
component / equipment manufactured according to either the same technical 
specifications as the ones applied for the design of the nuclear facility or technical 
specifications that were approved earlier by the regulator for the same application. 
Energoatom rarely procures components and equipment based on old legacy 
requirements, because for most SSCs it is impossible and impractical, in particular for 
I&C systems. As outlined above Energoatom aims for replacement with equivalent 
components and equipment whose definition is provided by regulatory guide NP 
306.2.106-2005 and following the applicable codes and standards. 
The level of efforts required for obtaining the desired QA for replacement / maintenance 
SSCs is generally perceived as high. The exact level of QA documentation for a 
replacement SSC is case specific and depends on the impact of the SSC replacement / 
modification on plant safety. Depending upon the case the required documentation 
package includes terms of reference, technical specification, design and operation 
documentation, QA programme, etc. Even for a SC3 SSC, as e.g. for most of the I&C 
systems and electrical equipment (some of them are SC2), a quite extensive 
documentation package is required as laid down in the NP and regulatory guidelines. 
Non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment may be used in 4H systems 
(non-nuclear safety (NNS) systems) without any limitations. In some cases where such 
components and equipment are connected to safety-relevant SSCs or in case of special 
operational conditions, some level of care is needed. For SSCs of SC3 and higher the 
usage of non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment is subject to the 
applicable codes and standards for nuclear and radiation safety. 
Energoatom has installed SSCs manufactured according to alternative nuclear codes and 
standards in its NPPs before and thus has significant experience in this. The challenge lies 
in the needed efforts for substantiation and receiving approval from the regulator. 
Modern state-of-the-art technologies may be used for SSCs in nuclear facilities of 
Energoatom. The applicable codes and standards require that the robustness of such 
technologies is underlined via scientific research, experience from nuclear facilities of 
other countries and recommendations of international organisations. If modern state-of-
the-art technologies are planned to be deployed for safety-related SSCs, testing of these 
technologies is mandatory in order to confirm required component / equipment 
characteristics and features. These tests are the main efforts for substantiation and to 
receive approval for their usage from the regulator. 
 
   
 
30 
2.12 United States of America 
The paragraphs below summarise the answers to the questionnaire kindly provided by 
EPRI and are meant for comparison, to assess whether supply chain issues in the U.S. 
are similar to the ones of European utilities and what is possible in the U.S. to address 
these issues.    
For U.S. utilities obsolescence is a primary concern as it increases lead time, costs and 
can result in additional engineering work preparing equivalency evaluations, design 
changes, etc. 
Most U.S. suppliers have been established for quite some time and are extremely willing 
to meet customer needs. However, due to market conditions, some suppliers have 
decided to discontinue aging product lines or abandon their nuclear QA programmes. For 
the majority of such cases, this is due to low demand / revenue from nuclear product 
lines. For a few such cases, it is due to new leadership that either opposes nuclear 
energy or fears potential liability claims related to use of their products in nuclear 
facilities. 
Generally it is difficult to attract new suppliers for the above reasons. In addition, 
potential new suppliers are not familiar with the current nuclear requirements or may not 
completely understand them. In addition, suppliers that provide safety-related items to 
commercial plants and several other types of nuclear facilities in the U.S. are subject to 
10CFR21 “Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance” [12]. Compliance with 10CFR21 
involves reporting defects and non-compliance associated with any safety-related item 
sold. The defect or non-compliance must be reported to all customers who purchased 
effected items as well as to the U.S. NRC. Furthermore, compliance with 10CFR21 entails 
providing access to the U.S. NRC for inspections. In addition, utilities (licensed to operate 
a commercial nuclear facility) in the U.S. must audit suppliers of safety related items / 
services at least once every 36 months. In addition to the cost and inconvenience 
associated with audits and inspections, suppliers have noted that the assessments are 
not always consistent and it seems like “requirements” and expectations change. In 
some cases, suppliers do not want to expose their quality programmes to the scrutiny of 
a nuclear audit, claiming that their “quality information” is proprietary. 
In the context of U.S. regulations, any replacement used in a safety-related application 
must be established as equivalent (within the existing, approved design) or as a new or 
modified design that is established as suitable through a design change process. 
Engineering resources and cost considerations tend to encourage replacing SSCs and 
parts “in kind” rather than using newer technologies on a part or component basis. 
However, obsolescence “forces” evaluation of newer technologies. In addition, newer 
technologies such as digital controls are sometimes incorporated at the system-level. The 
U.S. NRC has demanding expectations with respect to use of new technologies and some 
regulatory requirements are fairly new as far as implementation is concerned. New 
technologies may be better in one respect, but could also introduce new failure modes 
and challenges in other respects. 
Depending upon the specific situation “elaborate measures,” such as reverse-
engineering, are sometimes used. Many factors must be considered, and generally the 
more time that has elapsed since original design and procurement, the more challenge 
and potentially risk involved in making a change. A detailed process for reverse-
engineering was recently developed in response to U.S. regulatory concerns with 
reverse-engineered items17. The process, developed with participation of U.S. NRC staff, 
is EPRI report no. 3002011678 [13]. 
The level of efforts required for obtaining the desired QA documentation for replacement 
/ maintenance SSCs is perceived as moderate when using suppliers with recent 
 
17 Information Notice 2016-09, Recent Issues Identified When Using Reverse Engineering Techniques in the 
Procurement of Safety-Related Components. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C.: July 2016. ADAMS accession no. ML16075A285  
 
31 
experience. In general, augmented quality (non-safety-related items with some quality 
requirements) are well-understood and suppliers are either able to provide the required 
documentation or utilities are able to establish acceptability of the items. With regards to 
traditional safety classification18 (“safety-related”, non-safety-related and “augmented 
quality”) regulation applicable to commercial nuclear facilities in the U.S. does not 
demand the same level of quality. 
Non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment (typically referred to as 
commercial, non-nuclear or commercial-grade in the U.S.) are generally used in non-
safety-related applications for new-build if the items are not “first-of-a-kind” designs. 
In the U.S. alternative (non-US) nuclear codes and standards are not used. All SSCs 
installed in nuclear facilities in the U.S. must comply with standards specified in U.S. 
regulations such as 10CFR50.55a [14]. 
Regulatory hurdles preclude widespread use of digital technology without extensive 
reviews and regulatory scrutiny, but an effort is underway to facilitate modernisation of 
instrumentation controls. Early efforts are underway to investigate use of replacement 
items manufactured using advanced methods such as additive manufacturing, powder 
metallurgy, etc. Standardisation organisations are also working to enable widespread use 
of these technologies. 
 
 
18 Safety classification according to a risk-informed categorisation are typically not in use at U.S. plants 
although implementation is underway. 
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3 Summary 
The answers from the utilities of the various EU member states, Switzerland and Ukraine 
mostly confirm the already identified challenges described in Section 1.1. 
Questions 1 & 2: Level of concern about SSCs obsolescence issues and challenge 
to find new suppliers 
The utilities of the European countries that have answered the questionnaire are either 
significantly concerned about SSC obsolescence, like the Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Hungary, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, or SSC obsolescence is becoming a growing 
concern, as in the case of Belgium, Romania and the Ukraine. Not surprisingly the 
utilities of the above countries, with the exception of France and the Ukraine, have 
significant difficulties in finding new suppliers. The utilities in France and the Ukraine, 
EDF S.A. and Energoatom, operate large fleets of standardized reactors that makes them 
economically attractive companies for potential suppliers to make business with. The 
Hungarian utility MVM-Paks has a large stock of spare parts and makes continuous 
efforts to spot them on the open market and other sources, which provides some relief 
from the challenge of finding new suppliers. Slovenian utility NEK has a continuous 
investment programme in place, is well embedded in joint industry programmes related 
to supply chain (e.g. NUOG, EPRI, …) and has an established CGD process in place, 
reducing NEK’s vulnerability to SSC obsolescence and making it to some extent easier to 
find new suppliers. 
Questions 3 & 4: Repair vs. replacement of safety-related SSCs 
The utilities of all the European countries in scope of this report mostly avoid 
replacement of safety-related SSCs with better similar state-of-the-art ones. 
“Elaborative” maintenance and repair of already installed SSCs is the preferred path 
forward. Only if “elaborative” maintenance and repair is not possible anymore then 
replacement with better similar SSCs is performed requiring in most cases a lengthy 
modification process involving qualification and approval by the regulator. The Slovenian 
utility NEK replaces obsolete SSCs either with a direct replacement upon safety screening 
and where no modification is necessary, or with an alternative SSC in which case a 
modification process needs to be applied. If a commercial-grade item is used a CGD 
process needs to be applied. The Swiss utilities take the decision of “elaborative” 
maintenance and repair vs. replacement of obsolete SSCs on a case-by-case basis. If 
replacement of an obsolete SSC is needed, it should be preferably replaced with the 
same one to avoid otherwise necessary qualification and approval processes. This is also 
the approach taken by utilities of virtually all other countries. 
Question 5: Procurement of SSCs according to old legacy requirements 
Procurement of safety-related SSCs according to old legacy requirements (meaning to 
reproduce currently installed SSCs in nuclear facilities via e.g. reverse engineering) for 
their replacement is common practice in Finland and Spain and pursued for SSCs where 
the original requirements have not changed or, as in the case of Spain, the current 
regulation does not support a different way. In Sweden utilities and licensees also 
procure SSCs according to old legacy requirements to some extent to avoid qualification 
uncertainties and risks associated with replacement with more modern SSCs. 
Nuclearelectrica in Romania performs reverse engineering for those SSCs where the 
original design documentation is missing and the OEMs do not exist anymore. 
In all other countries procurement of SSCs in nuclear facilities is accomplished according 
to currently valid requirements or they are revised according to more modern state-of-
the-art SSCs. In Belgium, if replacement of a SSC with a similar state-of-the-art one is 
considered the original specifications are updated accordingly and a reconciliation is 
performed. In Hungary all SSCs procured, manufactured and installed in nuclear facilities 
are according to the requirements stipulated in the national regulation in force and the 
design base determined for the SSC in scope. In Slovenia procurement of new SSCs 
requiring design modification is performed according to up-to-date codes and standards 
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and requirements. Procurement of like-for-like replacements of installed SSCs is 
performed to its original codes, standards and requirements. Energoatom in Ukraine 
procures SSCs according to the current codes and standards and requirements. Procuring 
SSCs according to old legacy requirements is seen as impractical by Energoatom.    
Question 6: Efforts and graded approach for QA documentation 
With regards to the needed efforts for issuing QA documentation for replacement SSCs, 
there is a graded approach in place in most of the countries, in the sense that the level of 
required QA documentation is related to the SC of the SSC in scope, meaning that the 
amount of QA documentation for a SC3 SSC is lower than for a SC1 SSC. In the Czech 
Republic, Romania and Spain the efforts for issuing QA documentation for safety-related 
SSCs is perceived as high by the utilities, but there is a graded approach. In France the 
efforts for issuing SSC documentation is perceived as high, even for non-safety SSCs. In 
Slovenia the level of efforts for QA documentation depends upon type, SC and safety 
function of the SSC indicating a graded approach as well. In Switzerland the efforts 
depend upon the type and SC of the SSC and the experience of the supplier. In Belgium 
the level of effort for issuing QA documentation for safety-related SSCs is generally 
perceived as high by the utility, but this is seen as necessary. In Finland utilities perceive 
the level of efforts to issue QA documentation for safety-related SSCs as high, even for 
SC3 SSCs. The same applies to Sweden, where utilities need to perform specific QA-
routines for every supplier involving significant efforts with little or even no contribution 
to SSC end quality. In the Ukraine the level of efforts for issuing QA documentation is 
case dependent, but is generally perceived as high by the utility even for SC3 SSCs. 
Question 7: Use of non-nuclear industry components and equipment for safety-
related SSCs 
The use of non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment for safety-related 
SSCs in nuclear facilities is already possible in quite a number of European countries. In 
Slovenia a CGD procedure for the dedication of non-nuclear industry standard 
components and equipment for safety-related SSCs according to EPRI guidance no. 
3002002982 [7] is in place and common practice. In Belgium CGD is allowed and 
corresponding procedures are in place and have been used before, but the efforts for 
CGD of non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment are perceived as not 
being necessarily lower compared to procuring nuclear-grade items directly. In Romania 
and Spain CGD is also allowed and the utilities plan for wider use of CGD in the future 
and currently run corresponding projects. 
In France, Hungary and Switzerland non-nuclear industry standard components and 
equipment may in principle be used for safety-related SSCs following a CGD process, but 
this route is not pursued on a wide level. In Hungary components and equipment 
manufactured according to non-nuclear industry standards may be used for safety-
related SSCs in nuclear facilities providing they meet the relevant requirements and the 
supplier is qualified. In the Czech Republic utility CEZ has developed a CGD procedure 
and forwarded it to the regulator for discussion. Based on the proposed CGD procedure 
CEZ plans trials by applying the proposed procedure to a number of different SSCs. In 
Switzerland the use of non-nuclear industry standards is allowed for SC3 SSCs if their 
original design is based on them. 
In Finland and Sweden the use of non-nuclear industry standard components and 
equipment for safety-related SSCs is currently extremely difficult. But as mentioned in 
Sections 2.3 and 2.9 in both countries utilities currently run national projects with the 
aim of developing and implementing a systematic dedication and qualification process for 
using non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment for safety-related SSCs 
in nuclear facilities, mainly for SC3 SSCs, but also some SC2 SSCs. The national 
regulators of both countries are involved as observers in the national projects and agree 
with their aims. In Ukraine the use of non-nuclear industry standard components and 
equipment for safety-related SSCs in nuclear facilities is not allowed. 
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Question 8: Use of alternative nuclear codes or standards 
Concerning the use of alternative nuclear codes and standards the picture is quite diverse 
in Europe. In Belgium the usage of SSCs designed and manufactured according to 
alternative nuclear codes and standards (in this case nuclear codes and standards other 
than U.S.-based codes and standards, e.g. ASME BPVC) is common practice and included 
in the regulatory guidance. Similarly, in Ukraine the installation of SSCs designed and 
manufactured according to alternative nuclear codes and standards in nuclear facilities 
was done before and the utility Energoatom has built up significant experience in this. 
Moving along this route requires quite some efforts for substantiation (proof that the 
alternative nuclear code or standard delivers the same result as if the normal nuclear 
code or standard would have been used) and approval from the regulator. In the Czech 
Republic, Finland and Romania the use of alternative nuclear codes and standards for the 
design and manufacturing of SSCs is also possible after substantiation, which requires 
some efforts. In Sweden utilities and licensees have yet not pursued in this direction, but 
the benefits of doing so are seen as high. In Switzerland only ASME and KTA are allowed, 
so the use of alternative nuclear codes and standards is only possible after showing 
compliance with ASME and KTA. In France alternative nuclear codes and standards (KTA 
and ASME) have been used for a number of SC2 and SC3 SSCs in the EPR currently 
under construction in Flamanville, but the target quality level for these SSCs is the one 
according to RCC-M resulting in issuing of additional specifications to complement the 
requirements of ASME / KTA to obtain the quality level according to RCC-M. In Slovenia 
the utility NEK needs to comply with Slovenian national regulation, which follows U.S. 
regulation, which itself heavily relies on and stipulates use of U.S. nuclear codes, 
standards and practices at implementation level. Utilities in Spain do not pursue and plan 
to use alternative nuclear codes and standards other than what they use at the moment. 
Question 9: Use modern state-of-the-art technologies for safety-related SSCs 
The use of modern state-of-the-art technologies (e.g. additive manufacturing) for safety-
related SSCs is only possible in all of the above countries if these technologies are either 
covered by nuclear codes and standards or they have been nuclear qualified via 
extensive tests to demonstrate their robustness, reliability and safety function. 
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4 Conclusions 
The received answers show that the utilities in the majority of European countries with 
NPPs in operation are significantly concerned about reduced supply chain support and 
resulting challenges like SSC obsolescence and difficulty in finding new suppliers. 
“Elaborative” maintenance and repair of already installed SSCs is the preferred path 
forward for utilities in most European countries. Only if “elaborative” maintenance and 
repair is not possible anymore then replacement with modern similar SSCs is performed 
requiring in most cases lengthy, costly and risky dedication and qualification processes 
and approval by the regulator. In some countries procurement of safety-related SSCs to 
replace currently installed ones is performed according to old legacy requirements 
because the original requirements have not changed, to avoid qualification uncertainties 
and risks or because the current regulation does not support a different, modern and 
more efficient way forward. 
To solve the above supply chain issues the utilities in a number of European countries 
have performed or plan to perform CGD trials, have performed CGD for a number of 
safety-related SSCs before (e.g. Belgium, France and Switzerland), are in the process of 
developing and implementing own CGD processes to enable the use of modern high-
quality non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment for safety-related 
SSCs in nuclear facilities (e.g. Czech Republic, Finland and Sweden) or plan to use 
existing CGD processes more widely in the future (e.g. Spain and Romania). 
The utility of Slovenia, NEK, is not, or is only to a minor extent, affected by SSC 
obsolescence and does not have such difficulties in finding new suppliers compared to 
utilities of other European countries, despite running only one reactor. The key issue is 
that NEK has a continuous investment programme in place, participates in joint and 
proactive supply chain initiatives and has an established CGD process in place giving 
access to a sufficiently large pool of suppliers for all safety-related SSCs preventing it 
running into severe supply chain challenges. NEK work methods could be seen as a good 
example on how to resolve supply chain issues. However, whether this is the case needs 
further assessment going forward. 
Thus having CGD procedures in place, either U.S.-based according to EPRI guide no. 
3002002982 [7] as in Slovenia or own ones as it is aimed for in national nuclear industry 
projects in the Czech Republic, Finland and Sweden is key in solving the supply chain 
challenges currently facing European nuclear utilities, in particular for those that operate 
small fleets of reactors. The implementation and application of CGD processes requires 
quite some efforts by utilities, as the responsibility for assuring that the commercial item 
performs its safety function is shifted from the supplier to the utility or a third party 
organisation acting on behalf of the utility. But relieving the supplier from this task opens 
the door to new potential suppliers for utilities. The entry of new suppliers would in turn 
enable the use of modern high-quality SSCs in new build nuclear facilities as well as in 
the preventive and predictive maintenance to prevent failures of SSCs important to 
safety in the current European nuclear facility fleet.     
If utilities decide to implement CGD, the approval of the respective national regulator is 
normally required, as national regulation most likely may need to be changed to allow 
the use of CGD. This means that a decision to move along this route has to be taken by 
all the nuclear stakeholders (utilities and regulator) in each country individually. If 
utilities of European countries decide to implement and perform CGD they should aim for 
wide cross-border collaboration including joint issuing of common and coherent 
documentation (e.g. technical specifications for SSCs) and data sharing from dedication 
processes and qualification tests of non-nuclear industry standard components and 
equipment, as it is planned between Finnish and Swedish utilities following their national 
projects. This would be a valuable contribution to the harmonisation of SSC 
documentation and CGD processes in Europe. 
Ideally European utilities would perform CGD according to a common harmonised 
European approach or guidelines. Such an approach or guidelines would need to be 
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developed by European utilities in close interaction with European regulators based on 
international and European experience and accounting for European specifics. Developing 
such an approach or guidelines requires review of supply chain management practices, 
technical requirements (design, manufacturing) and QM practices for safety-related SSCs 
as well as benchmarking against technical requirements and QM practices of non-nuclear 
industries19. 
Concerning the use of alternative nuclear codes and standards Belgium could be seen as 
a forerunner and possibly a good example to other European countries. However, this 
needs to be further assessed and documented in order for other European countries to 
benefit and build on the Belgian nuclear industry practice.  
The use of non-nuclear industry standard components and equipment for safety-related 
SSCs after it went through a CGD process or the use of safety-related SSCs produced 
according to alternative nuclear codes and standards should not be limited to the current 
fleet of reactors, but should also become the common future best practice for new-build 
reactors, radioactive waste management facilities (e.g. for spent nuclear fuel) and even 
for future advanced reactors, i.e. SMRs and Gen IV reactors. Gen III/III+ and IV reactors 
are designed for 60 years and, considering the operating experience of the current fleet 
of reactors where LTO is common practice, operation of Gen III/III+ and IV reactors up 
to 80 years is a likely scenario. As the existence of OEMs of safety-related SSCs for such 
long time periods cannot be guaranteed and obsolescence of certain SSCs can be 
expected after a couple of years of operation (e.g. for I&C equipment), Gen III/III+ and 
IV reactors should be operated with CGD processes in mind straight from the start of the 
new build projects. Following this route for future advanced reactors straight from the 
beginning would avoid running into the supply chain challenges and legacy problems 
facing the current European facility fleet.   
In the end it should always be remembered that the safety of nuclear facilities is ensured 
by high-level principles [16], requirements and concepts [17], e.g. the concept of 
Defence-in-Depth. The supply chain strategy of a nuclear facility is inseparably connected 
with nuclear safety considerations and is thus based on these high-level principles, 
requirements and concepts. Nuclear facilities are designed, constructed, operated and 
maintained for safe and reliable operation and their safety may not be jeopardised by a 
single failure, human error or a combination of these. To ensure this safety-related SSCs 
of a nuclear facility have to comply with the concepts of diversity20, redundancy21, 
physical separation and functional independence [17] throughout the lifetime of the 
facility. This requires the timely implementation of preventive and predictive 
maintenance of nuclear facilities by use of modern SSCs of high quality and proven 
reliability, functioning when needed, from diverse and best available sources, including 
suppliers that offer and prefer producing SSCs according to non-nuclear industry 
standards or alternative nuclear codes and standards. 
EC-JRC continues to investigate the greater use of high-quality non-nuclear industry 
standard components and equipment in safety-related SSCs of nuclear facilities and 
greater use of SSCs according to alternative nuclear codes and standards to address 
supply chain challenges currently facing European utilities. In this sense EC-JRC intends 
to contribute to the review of supply chain management practices, technical 
requirements (design, manufacturing) and QM practices for safety-related SSCs and 
benchmarking these against technical requirements and QM practices of non-nuclear 
industries, as it does already within ongoing nuclear codes and standards development 
activities (e.g. CEN Workshop 64). EC-JRC intends to organise workshops with European 
regulators, technical safety organisations (TSOs) and utilities to inform and support them 
in this area, and already plans to organise a workshop on CGD primarily for European 
 
19 A detailed description of the tasks that need to be performed to enable widespread use of non-nuclear 
industry standard components and equipment for safety-related SSCs in European nuclear installations can 
be found in the FORATOM report on the topic (see [15]).  
20 Use of multiple different technologies to perform a single safety function. 
21 A safety function can be performed regardless of failure of single SSC. 
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regulators and TSOs towards the end of 2020 together with EC-ENER. EC-JRC intends to 
contribute to planed European or international guidelines on CGD. 
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